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abstract: Regret is different from remorse is different from shame is different
from guilt. At any rate, we can often make these distinctions. And we can
often describe attitudes to our past less-than-admirable actions that do not
fit easily into any of these categories. I shall attempt to characterize a range
of emotions which includes the emotions we apply these words to, but in
terms  that  do  not  presuppose  that  the  distinctions  between  them  are
psychologically or morally very deep. In fact, I don't think they are. Not that
there are not important distinctions to make here. I describe an alternative
set of distinctions which suggests that the line between moral and non-moral
is not well reflected in our attitudes to our past actions.
Regret is different from remorse is different from shame is different from
guilt. At any rate, we can often make these distinctions. And we can often
describe  attitudes to  our  past  less-than-admirable  actions  that  do  not  fit
easily into any of these categories. An essential preliminary question is how
to individuate emotions. When one says that one emotion is different from
another what does this mean? Rage is obviously different from sorrow, but
2rage  and  anger  could  be  thought  of  as  different  intensities  of  the  same
emotion. Obviously both are instances of some more general emotion, but
then anger and excitement are also instances of a different more general
emotion, which we might call arousal. There are many ways of subdividing
any set of things.
The list  that  includes regret,  remorse,  shame, guilt  and potentially  many
other emotions is not hard to characterize in a preliminary way. It consists of
affect-coloured attitudes to past actions that one does not now endorse. The
lack of endorsement is often moral: the emotion has an associated thought
that one should not have done something. This is not always so, depending a
bit on what one wants to include on the list. There is non-moral regret, in
which one regrets not having learned to play an instrument as a child, or
even  regrets  not  having  resisted  ones  scruples  over  a  morally  dubious
possibility. And embarrassment clearly often has nothing to do with morality.
(In some languages, for example Spanish, the same word is used for shame
and for embarrassment. So if one is thinking in terms of such a language one
would be inclined to say that there can be non-moral "shame".) But we need
a rough characterization of this family of emotions in order to get started, so
I shall take them all to be retrospective emotions of disapproval of oneself.
Qualifications will follow, but pointing out how rough this description is should
inject  a  note  of  warning  about  the  ambiguities  of  what  can be taken as
morality.
3There is an extensive discussion of these emotions in philosophy. My sense is
that the contrasts between them are understood in roughly the same way by
most writers, though different formulas are used to characterize them and
the  differences  between  them.  Besides  the  writings  of  Bernard  Williams,
referred to below, important works are Taylor (1985), Dilman (1999), and
Maibom  (2010).  Maibom  is  particularly  well-informed  psychologically.  My
contribution  to  the  discussion  is  in  Morton  (2013).  A  broad  connection
between emotion and morality is found in Prinz (2007). Prinz's discussion
makes moral questions almost a matter of taste; one might want to inject
more objectivity by making the retrospective emotions more central. I think
one could do this by adapting the arguments in Zagzebski (2003).
Take two intuitively different members of the family, for example regret and
shame.  How  can  we  describe  their  differences?  One  way  is  in  terms  of
associated thoughts. If you regret doing something then you think that you
should not have done it (in a wide sense of "should", to cover non-moral
regret). You can also regret not having done something, when the thought is
that you should've done it. If you feel shame about something then you think
that certain others will think badly of you in connection with it. (And typically
you  think  that  they  will  be  correct  in  thinking  badly  of  you.)  These  are
different thoughts. But there is a problem about individuating the emotions
entirely in terms of the thoughts. A person can have the emotion and not
4have the thought as a belief, in fact not even as a thought that the person
endorses  at  all.  You  can  describe  yourself  as  regretting  having  done
something even though you realize on reflection that it was the right thing to
do, but the regret just does not go away. Or you can describe yourself as
feeling  shame  for  something  that  in  fact  everyone  praised  you  for.  The
looseness  of  the  connection  between  emotion  and  thought  is  sometimes
illustrated with the example of irrational fear: you can know that this tiny
harmless spider is not going to hurt you, but still be terrified of it. For the
connection with thoughts see Solomon (1993), Nussbaum (2001). Solomon
and Nussbaum put thoughts at the heart of emotion, which most of us now
think wrong. (For Nussbaum this identification of thinking and feeling is the
Stoic account of emotion. While I am no expert on the topic, I find this hard
to  believe.)  For  spider-type  examples  see  Greenspan  (1989)and  Tappolet
(2010). These threads are pulled together in Goldie (2000).
This situation can arise when there is an associated thought but it is more
complicated. This is true in some of the cases that interest Bernard Williams,
where a person regrets doing something because of the moral price, but if
given the same choice again would do the same thing again. (Typically, it is
the lesser of two evils.) But not all situations where the thought does not
characterize the emotion are like this. You can regret not having learned to
play the saxophone as a teenager even though you realize that in developing
your promising athletic skills rather than your inadequate musical skills you
5made a good choice. 
Bernard Williams uses the term "agent regret" in a way that I find rather
confusing.  I  think  he  is  trying  to  avoid  distinguishing  between  different
retrospective  emotions  with  a  moral  content  while  distancing  them from
regret for something that did not turn out well for oneself. I find this to be at
odds with a vague aim of  many of  his  writings,  that of  distancing moral
considerations from adherence to a determinate set of rules. This issue is
very  hard  to  make  precise,  and  Williams  is  never  explicit  about  it.  See
Williams  (1973a),  Williams  (1973b),  Williams  (1981),  Williams  (1985),
Williams  (1993).  The  same  stimulating  and  ambiguous  view  on  both
retrospective  emotions  and  the  nature  of  morality  is  discernible  in  all  of
these. See also Rorty (1980). I  have defended a position a little like one
reading of Williams on morality in Morton (1996) and with a very different
argument in Morton (2006).
Another problem about characterizing emotions in terms of thoughts is that
the  bare  thought  is  possible  without  any  emotion  at  all.  For  an  extreme
example  imagine  a  very  calculating  psychopath  who realizes  that  various
important people would be appalled by an action, and that he really should
not have done it, intellectually speaking, but feels no shame about having
done it. Related to this is the fact that desires are as important as beliefs.
Regret is connected to the desire to act differently in future, and shame to
6the desire not to be noticed or discovered. ("I could have sunk through the
floor".) For emotions we need thoughts, wants, and feelings to be unified,
and not simply to coincide.
My response to this need for unity will be to look for a unity in the various
effects of an emotion. The strategy will be to get a formulation of what the
effects of a particular emotion have in common, to find some psychological
feature that is linked to it, and then to individuate emotions in terms of this
feature.   
points of view
The articulating feature that I will make central is that of an imagined point
of view. I'll get to it in several stages.
The thoughts that accompany retrospective emotions concern what it would
have been better to do. (As already stated the thoughts may not be fully
endorsed by the person and they may not centre on a characteristically moral
conception  of  the  value  of  acts.)  These  thoughts  fit  with  corresponding
desires,  which may also be described as intentions or  resolutions.  (For  a
general  connection  with  desire  see  Tappolet  (2010).)  They  are  largely
directed at doing things differently in the future. A regretful person vows not
to make that mistake again; an ashamed person vows not to be in a position
7where they can be caught  that  way again;  a remorseful  person vows to
change  their  character.  As  with  the  thoughts,  these  may  not  be  fully
endorsed by the person.
The combination of the thought and the desire motivate particular actions,
though these may not be performed because other thoughts and desires are
more  dominant.  (The  connection  between  emotion  and  motivation  is
discussed in Tappolet (2000), (2016), and Brady (2015), with more emphasis
on  value-directed  action  in  Tappolet  and  more  emphasis  on  information-
directed  action  in  Brady.)  A regretful  person has some motivation  to  act
differently in similar circumstances; an ashamed person has some motivation
to  avoid  situations  where  their  misdeeds  or  incompetences  are  visible,
whether  by  not  performing  them  or  by  performing  them  less  visibly;  a
remorseful person has some motivation to take their life in hand and change
some fundamental aspects of it. To repeat, the person may not do any of
these actions, since the motivation may be weaker than the motivation to do
incompatible actions. But there is a pressure to do them, which the person
may choose to resist, and often ought to resist. This is a difference between
the motivations that stem from retrospective emotions and those that stem
from non-dominant beliefs and desires. In the latter case it is usually not
difficult to resist doing something when you really have a stronger motive to
do something else. But emotions are always there pressing, even when the
pressure does not correspond to what you officially think.
8This pressure is the affective side of the emotion. The person finds reactions
and the general direction of their thinking influenced as part of what it is like
to be that person at that time. An irrational and disavowed fear of a tiny
harmless spider makes you have fantasies of the spider attacking you and
makes you identify possible routes of escape. Your heart rate increases and
your  breath  comes  short,  just  as  it  would  if  you  were  really  planning  a
sudden exit.  Similarly  for  the feeling of,  say,  remorse.  You find plans for
reforming your life occurring to you, which exert a pressure to carry them
out  although  you  may also  have  reason  to  resist  the  pressure.  You  find
yourself weary as if from the deep self-examination this would require, even
if you are not conscious of any such self-examination.
There  is  a  way  of  representing  the  pressure  in  the  special  case  of
retrospective "moral" emotions, that is quite revealing. Moral judgement is
made by people judging their own or other people's actions, but in the case
of emotions the judgement may not be endorsed. It is as if someone else
were making it, someone else to whom one can have a variety of attitudes.
There is the simple case where a person thinks that she has done wrong, and
the subtler case where she thinks that someone she imbues with authority
thinks  that  she  has done wrong.  Even in  the first  case inasmuch as the
attitude represents itself as moral it claims a certain objectivity: someone
with sufficient knowledge or authority or who had given the issue enough
9reflection would take the action to be wrong. There would be a very literal
pressure in that this person would be trying to make ones acts or personality
different.
A number of writers have made connections between emotions and imagined
points of view. See the essays in Nichols (2006), including Morton (2006).
Gendler (2011) is a comprehensive account of imagination in philosophy, and
Harris  (2011)  argues,  with  a  lot  of  data  about  small  children,  for  its
fundamental role in psychology. There is a very general discussion of the role
of imagination in moral epistemology in Gibert (2012).
This suggests a tidy formulation. The person considers or imagines a point of
view from which the action would be condemned. She imagines a person to
whom she has some variety of deference who has a negative attitude to the
action. This is very general, as we can fill in the particular deference and the
particular character of the negative attitude to fit the different retrospective
emotions.
Standard  labels  for  emotions  in  the  retrospective  spectrum  can  be
interpreted in these terms. In shame a person imagines an observer who
finds the action less than admirable. The observer may represent a moral
consensus, in which case the sense of appearing unworthy approaches the
sense of actually being worthy. (Though one may think that the consensus is
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wrong.) Or the observer may represent a vivid attitude that the action is
undignified  or  even  comic.  Then  shame  fades  into  embarrassment.  The
person who feels ashamed may not agree with the imagined point of view,
but inasmuch as she feels ashamed or embarrassed she senses the pressure
from this possible attitude. In regret the person imagines a knowledgeable
and  authoritative  point  of  view  from  which  an  alternative  action  was
preferable. The preferability may be moral, generating that particular variety
of regret. Or it may be practical, representing what the person might have
chosen if they had known then what they do now and had time to think over
their options. 
In  remorse,  when  contrasted  with  other  similar  emotions,  the  person
imagines a point of view that focuses on the effects of the action on some
other person, and bases its judgement on the situation of this victim. The
"victim"  may  in  fact  not  disapprove  of  the  action,  but  inasmuch  as  the
emotion is of remorse it imagines how that person might have or perhaps
should have disapproved. (You help a friend obtain a dose of an addictive
drug.  The  friend  is  grateful.  Later  he  dies  of  an  overdose  and  you  feel
remorse for having helped him.) And in guilt — the emotion of feeling guilty,
not the state of being culpable — a person imagines an authority figure who
condemns them for performing a particular action. The imagined figure need
not exist, and even if they do exist they may not have the authority that
imagination bestows on them: it is the respect that justified authority would
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confer, that is imagined.
The  imagined  points  of  view  may  not  be  those  of  any  real  people  or
collectives. The machinery can also individuate emotions which do not have
tidy labels in English, or for that matter emotions that are not acknowledged
in the conventional repertoire. In the following two sections I describe two of
these.
remorse that does not present itself as moral
An emotion can have much of the force of a moral sentiment without the
person  having  the  thoughts  that  one  might  think  would  go  with  it.  An
example is given by Jonathan Bennett's famous case of Huckleberry Finn, in
Bennett (1973). Huck has helped the slave Jim to escape, and realizes that
this goes against the moral code in which he was raised. He is depriving Jim's
owner of her property. Bennett quotes Mark Twain as attributing the following
thoughts to Huck
(a)  I couldn’t get that out of my conscience, no how nor no way. ... I
tried to make out to myself that I warn’t to blame, because I didn’t run
Jim off from his rightful owner; but it warn’t no use, conscience up and
say, every time: ‘But you knowed he was running for his freedom, and
you  could  a  paddled  ashore  and  told  somebody.’  That  was  so—I
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couldn’t get around that, no way. That was where it pinched.
(b)  I knowed very well I had done wrong, and I see it warn’t no use
for me to try to learn to do right; a body that don’t get started right
when he’s little, ain’t got no show. ... Then I thought a minute, and
says to myself, hold on—s’pose you’d a done right and give Jim up;
would you feel better than what you do now? No, says I, I’d feel bad—
I’d feel just the same way I do now. Well, then, says I, what’s the use
you learning to do right, when it’s troublesome to do right and ain’t no
rouble to do wrong ... . So I reckoned I wouldn’t bother no more about
it, but after this always do whichever come handiest at the time.
In (a) Huck is telling himself that he has done wrong, violated conscience
and made himself blameworthy. Moreover he feels a form of guilt: "that was
where it pinched." In (b) he describes himself as incurably immoral, and as
taking the easiest and most self-centred course. He admits to himself that he
would "feel bad" (meaning not "feel like a bad person" but "have a nasty
feeling") if he were to do the right thing. So he has a choice of retrospective
emotions:  the  one  that  he  identifies  with  morality  and  the  one  that
corresponds to his deeper feelings. He is torn between them.
How to describe these two emotions? It is not extremely unusual to have
simultaneous emotions that tend in opposite directions.  (The normality of
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this is defended in Zimmerman (1993).) One can be attracted to and afraid
of the same object, for example. Huck's first emotion is essentially shame:
he  feels  how  disapproving  the  community  of  his  upbringing,  which  he
identifies  with,  would  be  of  what  he  has  done.  There  is  an  element  of
remorse,  also,  because  he  can  feel  the  potential  condemnation  of  Jim's
“owner”. It is a special kind of shame, though, because at some level he also
imagines a point of view which would disapprove of frustrating the escape
plans of slaves. This manifests itself in knowing that he would feel bad at
turning Jim in. (And in fact he does feel bad just thinking about it.) But this
point of view is not consciously available to him. It is potentially available, at
most as a reconstruction of a pattern of reactions that is more consistent
than he realizes. So he imagines a point of view which is appalled at his
action and he also imagines a point of view on that point of view which is
appalled at it.  But this second imagining is  unconscious and implicit.  The
essentials are that he has a meta-emotion of remorse directed at a first-
order emotion of shame, and that the meta-emotion is less articulated and
less available to his  conception of  himself.  (Emotions about emotions are
discussed in Mendonça (2013).)
There is  another  striking feature of  his shame. It  is  shame in that he is
condemned from a conventional point of view, but his attitude to this point of
view is very mixed. As explained, some of his other emotions undercut the
authority  of  this  point  of  view,  although  he  realizes  it  is  the  attitude  of
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parents and elders, and other people he looks up to. So it is in a way rather
embarrassment-like. A similar emotion would be that of a moral philosopher
who disapproves of  an action as a result  of  thinking it  through from the
theories that she accepts, although it fits with her unreflective and unofficial
intuitions about  action.  (Or the opposite,  an action that she intellectually
finds acceptable and even to be encouraged, but which something in her
recoils from.)
It would help to have a label for emotions like this. I shall refer to them as
"undermined shame". Undermined regret would also be possible, for example
in the case in which you think and correspondingly feel that your action was
a mistake, but you are also glad that you did it. Perhaps you have married
somebody and now realize that this will  frustrate many of your plans and
commitments, as this person will cost you a lot of money and come between
you and some of your friends and mentors. So you take it to be a mistake.
But there is still real love, in spite of the quarrels over practical matters, and
one of the reasons for the love is an attraction to this person's attitude to
life, which is very different from the one that you think you have.
retrospection and psychological damage
We come now to an emotion that seems to me to belong in the retrospective
family, but which I have difficulty classifying as a form of shame, regret, or
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remorse.  I  shall  make  psychological  assumptions,  which  are  not  at  all
obvious.  But  I  shall  assume  them,  and  readers  who  have  doubts  can
substitute the weaker assumption that such things are possible, and then
consider whether the emotions I describe would be plausibly ascribed.
People undergo various traumatic experiences which have long-term effects.
Dramatic  examples  are  abuse  in  childhood,  rape,  and  violence,  and  less
dramatic  examples  are  demeaning  parents,  not  being  taken  seriously
because of one’s gender or orientation, or threats. Years later they can suffer
many  symptoms  of  damaged  self-respect.  The  symptoms  are  from  a
narrowly rational point of view puzzling, because the experiences from which
they stem do not provide anything like evidence that the person is incapable
or unworthy. Among the effects of damaged self-respect is a tendency to feel
that things are one's fault. This can focus on the experience in question, and
notoriously children do not report abuse by adults because they think that
they had somehow been responsible themselves. And fantasies of guilt are
quite common in long-term reactions to nasty experiences. But the scope can
be much wider. The person can acquire a disposition to think that unrelated
developments have occurred because of their faults. So we are dealing with a
disposition  to  retrospective  self  critical  emotions  whatever  their  objects.
(There is an opposite pathology, also, of people who are immune to self-
critical  emotions.  That is  also not unknown but digresses from our topic,
although I suppose there is a connection in the form of people who cannot
16
allow themselves  the  tiniest  bit  of  self-criticism for  fear  that  it  open the
floodgates to an enormous sense of inadequacy.)
 
Assume that this happens. There is evidence for the phenomenon, although I
take  the  unity  of  its  causes  still  to  be  properly  established,  in  Bernstein
(2015) Kashdana, Todd, and others (2006), and Orth and R. Robins (2013).
I make a connection with emotions of self-ascription in  Morton (to appear)
and Morton (2017). The associated emotions do not have a particular action
of the person as their target, but rather the value of the person In some
general  way.  So  it  is  a  kind  of  disposition,  a  standing  mood  or  trait  of
character, always ready to take the person as being at fault. But, if you'll
forgive the slight psychoanalytical tone, it also has a particular object, the
traumatic event itself. Without identifying this as the focus of the emotion,
the person has an attitude to it, that in some unspecified way it is her own
fault, and this generates a sense of worthlessness that is at the root of the
many occasions when the person has a particular case of regret, remorse, or
shame.
Consider this underlying emotion, that one did wrong in causing the events
that damaged one. Call it "self-accusatory retrospection". We can take it as
shame or  as  remorse.  Shame is  pretty  simple  to  apply  here.  The victim
imagines an observer who sees her role in the events critically (the imagined
perception is of course itself imagined). This imagination is painful, no doubt
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because it brings back the events themselves. So the victim wishes she was
not so imaginable, that she should be invisible from any such point of view.
Remorse can also be applied, though it is rather peculiar. The victim imagines
the perpetrator as harmed, as having their good character spoiled by the
provocations of the victim. So the victim has harmed the perpetrator, and the
perpetrator judges the victim harshly but appropriately for this.  
Regret is hardest to apply. The victim would have to imagine a point of view
that repeats her decisions and arrives at a better choice. Perhaps there was a
safer course of action, the thought would be, that would not have resulted in
the catastrophe. The alternative might be less encouraging, less vulnerable,
more  matter-of-fact  or  tougher:  "It  was  my  fault  to  have  got  into  that
situation in the first place."
However we decide to classify it, this self-directed accusatory emotion can
generate regret,  remorse, guilt,  and other negative emotions towards the
victim's  acts  on  particular  occasions.  These  can  cover  the  range  of  such
emotions: regret for this, remorse for that, guilt for a third thing. As I see it,
we have a hard-to-classify core emotion that generates a disposition to a
range of more tractable particular attitudes. These can be consciously held,
although the core emotion almost never will be. People are often mistaken
about their psychological dispositions, in part because the primary evidence
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concerns the patterns of their behaviour, which it is easy to misinterpret. In
addition, although people can attribute emotions to themselves on the basis
of  affect these attributions easily  confuse emotions with others that have
similar  affects.  And it  is  interesting  that  among the  likely  confusions  are
those of one retrospective emotion for another: for example, a person who
does not want to admit that she has done something wrong may label as
regret what in fact  is better described as remorse. (So why think that it
exists? Well, the disposition is generated by an attitude to the crucial events.
And it is a charged, feeling-laden, thing. So if we are to take it as itself an
emotion at all it must be something like what I have described.)
false remorse
One last  example of  an emotion of  retrospective moral self-condemnation
that does not fit into the standard list is feeling guilt for an action that one
did not in fact commit. The background is in classic work on induced memory
by Loftus and others,  as in  Loftus and Ketcham (1996).  This  shows that
suitable largely verbal intervention can cause people to have memories that
do not correspond to real events. The objects of these false memories can be
as varied as recent traffic accidents and long-ago sexual abuse. This should
change  our  thinking  on  many  topics.  They  include  confessions  in  which
accused  people  recall  committing  crimes  that  were  in  fact  committed  by
others. A powerful journalistic account of one such case is in Aviv (2017).
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The  central  person  in  this  case  is  relevant  to  our  issues  because  while
knowing that she is innocent she still feels remorse for a murder that she
was nowhere near and took no part in. Thoughts about it and images of her
participation in it haunt her painfully. (A detailed psychological reconstruction
of such real-world cases would be valuable. In this case it would focus on
details of her interrogation and on things she and others did and said during
her years of prison. There is a suggestion that psychological damage earlier
in  life  may make one more susceptible to  such things,  though no one is
immune to them. This  would  make a  connection with  some of  the other
remorse-like cases.) 
I said that she "feels remorse". Is she remorseful? In an obvious way she
cannot be, because she knows that she did nothing wrong, inflicted no harm
on the victim. But what else could I have said? She has experiences which
are like those of remorseful people and it seems likely that the psychological
process has a lot in common with remorse. But there is a crucial difference,
which we could describe as semantic: her crime does not exist. It is not hard
to imagine cases with similar characteristics. Someone could feel remorse for
hurtful behaviour in a dream, and could feel compelled to apologize for it.
(The object of the harm might not exist, in which case the apology would
have to be fantasy also.) Someone might feel shame for un-uttered and out
of character racist remarks. (Perhaps they contained a very appealing pun.
The most responsible humans have their infantile side.) And anyone could
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easily feel something subjectively like regret at not having given in to an
impulse — to insult a powerful pompous leader, to commit a hopeless and
immoral act of passion — that would have been catastrophic. It is plausible
that states like each of these can really happen. Relatively inconsequential
instances, such as the final regret case, are probably much more common
than the tragic real remorse case I began with.
To  smooth  cases  like  these  into  the  multidimensional  continuum  of
retrospective emotions I would suggest going back to the basic structure.
One imagines a person to whom one has an attitude of a respectful kind —
that's  what  makes  the  emotion  moral  —  who  has  an  attitude  of  a
judgemental  kind  to  ones  performance  of  an  action.  The  feeling  of  the
emotion is a compound of the respect and the judgement. All the emotions I
have discussed, and potentially others, can be fitted into this structure. In
the  cases  in  question  —  false  remorse,  false  regret, and  so  on  —  the
imagined judgemental person is imagined as themselves imagining an action,
supposing that it actually exists. This imagined person may be the performer
of the imagined act in their more knowledgeable state, but their imagination
of the act is still vivid and produces an affect that can be overwhelming. It
can exert considerable pressure on the person's future thinking and action.
So it is subjectively and pragmatically of a kind with the other emotions of
retrospective self-directed moral evaluation.
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conclusion 
It is generally accepted that there are a number of retrospective morally-
coloured  emotions.  The standard  distinction  between  shame cultures  and
guilt cultures is evidence for a weak version of this, as is the fact that many
languages have an extensive vocabulary for distinguishing between emotions
in  this  family.  I  have been claiming that there are potentially  very many
retrospective emotions, perhaps even infinitely many. The argument for this
has been that we can make a classification scheme that the standard labels
in English fit into nicely, and which also has room for many other types of
these emotions. It  is  important here that the classification system comes
with a way of individuating the emotions, to reassure us that items fitting
into different boxes in the system are indeed different emotions.
These  emotions  are  important  because  they  have  central  roles  in  our
principled behaviour towards one another. The pressure that they put on our
motivation leads us to change our plans, our attitudes, and inasmuch as we
are capable  of  it  our personalities.  They do this  in  different ways,  regret
being focused particularly on change of plans, shame on change of manner,
and remorse on change of personality. The novel labels that I introduced also
connect to changes in motivation. Undermined shame may allow Huck one
day to make the transition from his childish shame-based morality to a more
complex one shaped by regret and remorse. And it will often allow people to
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play lip-service to a conventional code while actually operating at a more
nuanced level. Self-accusatory retrospection, the victim blaming herself, can
be  powerful  in  buttressing  social  cohesion  and  in  maintaining  traditional
respectability, though from an enlightened perspective it is perverse. A milder
version  of  it  can  also  serve  a  more  benign  function,  curbing  the
overconfidence  of  those  who  while  rarely  breaking  any  explicit  rules
continually bring trouble on themselves and others. (A very sharp remark
that I  once heard a wise person make of  a well-known philosopher:  "it's
never his fault, but it is always someone else who gets hurt.")
Of course, the retrospective emotions are not the only ones playing similar
roles. The family of disagreement, disapproval, and horror, and the family of
agreement, disapproval, and enthusiasm, among others, are also involved.
No doubt there are parallels and connections between the families,  and I
would conjecture that these too have potentially  more members than we
have words for. So there is a truly monstrous classification system lurking in
the background.
The point I want to end the paper with, though, is that the variety of moral
emotions has implications for the unity,  or not,  of  morality.  (The Bernard
Williams papers already referred to are relevant here, as are Morton (1996)
and Morton (2009).) In cases like the Huck Finn example emotions in the
same family conflict, and there are cases with much more familiar emotions
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(Zimmerman (1993) again). It is for instance perfectly possible that someone
feels shame about doing something which they would feel remorse about not
doing. Standing up for their sexual identity in a homophobic culture would be
an example. (The emotions could be distinct but consistent if whenever one
applied the others did not. But it seems that the conflict is more direct than
this. They are contradictories rather than simply contraries.) So suppose that
someone is  avoiding situations  that  might  lead  to  any such retrospective
emotion (they are all negative in affect), avoiding actions of types that have
led  to  these  in  the  past,  also  avoiding  actions  of  types  that  the  person
disapproves of in others, and so on. Is there a single coherent pattern of
behaviour, even by the standards current in a particular culture, that this
picks out? Do the emotional underpinnings of moral behaviour determine a
single style of action? 
It  seems unlikely,  given  what  we  have  seen.  There  would  have  to  be  a
gigantic coincidence, or some dominating extra factor, for all these factors to
pull together coherently. Can Huck Finn be both a cooperative member of his
society and a force for moral progress? Can one both punish the guilty in
accordance with the guilt feelings that they ought to have, and be free of the
remorse that follows from inflicting trouble on others? If the retrospective
emotions play a large role in the psychology of moral behaviour — whether
or not they are as important in general abstract accounts of what is right —
then the best bet is that moral behaviour, acting decently, is a diffuse bundle
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with  many  different  aspects.  We  emphasize  different  tendencies  in  it
depending on what matters to us at a particular moment.
Adam Morton
University of British Columbia
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